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Abstract. Corporate governance in today’s modern economies is growing in importance within 
the growth accounting equation. Although we look at corporate governance as final product 
of 20/21st century economies, old economic growth theories were aware of its importance for 
growth and development. Roots of corporate governance go back to the ancient economies 
of India and Greece also. This paper offers a consistent literature review assessing the nexus 
between corporate performance and economic growth. Individual and cross-country studies 
show corporate governance in majority of the cases positively affects firms performance and in 
turn nations’ economic growth. Empirical and theoretical research show corporate governance 
is an important growth determinant to be reviewed in the field of growth models. This article 
summarizes main findings providing future research directions on the corporate governance – 
economic growth nexus. 
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Introduction 
“In its broadest sense, corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance 
between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. The 
governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to 
require accountability for the stewards of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly 
as possible the interest of individuals, of corporations, and of society. The incentive to 
corporations and to those who own and manage them to adopt internationally accepted 
governance standards is that these standards will assist them to achieve their aims to 
attract investment. The incentive for their adoption by states is that these standards will 
strengthen their economies and encourage business probity” (Claessens 2006: 94).
“The objective of a good corporate governance framework would be to maximize 
the contribution of firms to the overall economy – that is, including all stakeholders. 
Under this definition, corporate governance would include the relationship between 
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shareholders, creditors, and corporations; between financial markets, institutions, and 
corporations; and between employees and corporations” (Claessens 2006: 94).
There is a vast body of economic and legal literature where the concept of corporate 
governance is (attempted to be) defined. Definitions are similar, but still, they differ. 
For instance, MacMillan and Downing (1999), as cited in Gokhan Gunay (2008: 1) de-
fine corporate governance as a system by which companies are directed and controlled 
to produce high financial performance, whilst Letza et al. (2004) as cited in Gokhan 
Gunay (2008: 2) emphasize that corporate governance is about institutional arrange-
ments for relationship among various economic actors, who may have direct or indirect 
interests in corporation. Both definitions are correct, but the difference arises from 
the author’s point of view. First definition is “shareholder – oriented” while second 
(broader) definition is “stakeholder – oriented”.
Namely, corporate governance scholars are (generally) “pro shareholders” or “pro stake-
holders” oriented, and consequently they stand for shareholders or stakeholders govern-
ance model (Gangone, Ganescu 2014). 
Countries with better corporate governance achieve higher income growth rates, same 
as countries with a larger share of socially responsible firms (Škare, Golja 2014). Meas-
uring corporate governance impact on the firm’s performance and in turn economic 
growth is subject to noteworthy methodological limitations. Cross-country studies show 
the link between corporate governance and financial performance is highly biased. Us-
ing different indicators (scores) for corporate governance results in mixed (positive/
negative) impacts on firm’s financial performances. In this article such methodological 
limitations are addressed providing guidelines and future directions for measuring cor-
porate governance impact on economic growth. Using Tobin’s Q, capital expenditures, 
REO, net profit margin, net sales growth, ROA as proxy for corporate governance show 
diverse empirical links to firms’ performances. Ownership structure and dominant con-
trol rights have deep impact on innovation dynamics and thus economic growth. 
This paper is structured as follows. Introduction offers summary on corporate govern-
ance importance and state of research. Section 1 explains the concept of corporate 
governance while section 2 tries to depict the framework for an efficient corporate 
governance system. Section 3 offers theoretical and empirical findings on the possible 
link that exists between corporate governance and firms’ performances. Summary of 
the empirical findings on this link is presented in section 4. Section 5 reviews state of 
theoretical and empirical findings explaining the impact of corporate governance on 
economic growth. Future guidelines and directions to follow for future corporate gov-
ernance – growth studies is discussed in the conclusions. 
1. The concept of corporate governance
According to Shareholders' governance model (Demsetz 1983; Fama 1980; Jensen, 
Meckling 1976), only the interest of shareholders should be considered in the gov-
ernance of the corporation. Shareholders are regarded as owners of their shares and 
co-owners of the company. Thus, directors are considered as their agents – obliged to 
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maximize their principals’ profit. Moreover, according to Fama and Jansen (1983) as 
cited in Gokhan Gunay (2008: 8), shareholders are the residual claimants who bear eco-
nomic risk, and therefore the value of their shares should be maximized (see Agrawal, 
Knoeber 2012). 
According to Stakeholders' governance model (Clarke 1998; Mills, Weinstein 2000; 
Post et al. 2002), the interest of all stakeholders should be considered in the governance 
of corporations. Blair (1998) emphasizes that shareholders are not the only residual 
claimants or risk bearers, because other stakeholders such as employees (Penger, Černe 
2014) make firm-specific investment, i.e., specificity (Gokhan Gunay 2008). Moreover, 
Plender (1998) points out that for modern Anglo-Saxon corporations there is no sense in 
understanding shareholders as residual risk takers. That is because financial institutions 
own most of the company shares, and these institutions diversify their risk (Gokhan 
Gunay 2008).
In Anglo-Saxon countries, the structure of shareholders is usually dispersed. Sharehold-
ers are “weak” and unable to control firm managers who control the company. It was 
Adam Smith (1776) who first had noticed that:
“The directors of such (joint-stock) companies, however, being the managers rather of 
other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private co-
partnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt 
to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honor, and very easily 
give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, 
must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a com-
pany.” – as cited in Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
This problem was lately described as principal-agent problem (or agency problem). 
Agency theory, introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976), attempts to reduce agency 
problem (in economic terminology) or to decrease the conflict of interest between dif-
ferent groups involved in corporate governance (in legal terminology). Thus, it advises 
companies to implement the system of corporate governance that induces directors to 
act in their principals’ best interest (Maurović, Hasić 2014).
In Continental European countries the shareholders’ structure is traditionally concentrat-
ed, what means that one (or several shareholders who act in concern) have control over 
the company, as they control decision making process in general meetings of sharehold-
ers and on board level – as they can impact on directors. In this kind of companies, the 
agency problem between shareholders and directors does not exist (or it is negligible), 
but regularly there is a divergence between the controlling and non-controlling share-
holder’s interest. In economic theory, it is known as second-leveled agency problem 
(Davies 2000; Armour et al. 2009). 
It is in Continental-European Company Law legal doctrine where for the first time was 
emphasized that joint-stock company is a person with its interests (Schmidt 1997). Ac-
cordingly, as a person, it may not be owned by someone else (neither by the natural 
person nor a legal entity). Shareholders are only the members of the company. They 
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hold shares, and consequently they have certain governing rights – the most important 
is the right to exercise their vote at general meeting of shareholders, but shareholders 
should not be considered as owners of the company, and, therefore, they do not have any 
property right in the enterprise (see Croatian Constitutional Court, Case U-I-4120/2003). 
Directors are agents of the company, what means that company is their principal (AktG 
par. 78/1; Croatian Companies Act, par. 241/1). Accordingly, directors are obliged to run 
a business in the best interest of the company as a whole, not just in the shareholders’ 
interest (Cahn, Donald 2010). The letter approach is logical if we bear in mind that in 
Continental-European countries the shareholders’ structure is traditionally extremely 
concentrated, so identifying company’s interest with shareholders’ interest would practi-
cally mean identification with controlling shareholder’s personal interests – what would 
be extremely discriminating for minority shareholders and the mere essence of co-
shareholdership would be denied. 
In Continental-European countries the doctrine of “company’s best interest” have gone 
so far that even shareholders are obliged to exercise their votes in the best interest of 
the company as a whole, instead in their personal interest (see Cases Linotype 1988, 
BGHZ 103, 184 and Girmes 1995, BGHZ 129, 136 as cited in Pistor and Chenggang 
(2002: 33–34).
Even in Anglo-Saxon countries directors owe so-called fiduciary duties (of care and 
loyalty) vis-à-vis the company (see: Companies Act 2006, par. 170/1). Therefore, direc-
tors are obliged to take decisions in the best interest of the company as a whole, not in 
the best interest of shareholders. It means that directors have to take care of long-term 
interest of the company (Companies Act 2006, par. 172/1).
After a brief overview of corporate governance definition development, we may con-
clude that defining corporate governance exclusively as a tool for shareholders’ profit 
increase seems to be obsolete. Namely, every company which intends to have easily 
access to capital (either equity or debt capital), which intends to employ “first class” 
employees in an attempt to produce “first class” products or to offer the best quality 
services etc., is compelled to implement “the best practice of corporate governance” in 
their governance system, and the best practice of corporate governance always “bears 
in mind” interests of vast spectrum of stakeholders. All relevant stock-exchange mar-
kets have issued their Codes of Corporate Governance and only corporations that have 
implemented the governance practice recommended by those codes are listed on the 
stock exchange lists. The latter statement is not entirely correct. Namely, Codes of 
Corporate Governance are not binding instruments; they function on so-called “comply 
or explain system” that was first introduced in UK by Cadbury’s Code (1992). Accord-
ingly, corporations that haven’t implemented the best governance practice recommended 
by the code may be listed on the stock-exchange only if they manage to explain why 
they have chosen not to apply the code’s recommendation. Nevertheless, by explaining 
that they haven’t implemented codes’ recommendations, corporations indirectly admit 
that they are not desirable to invest in. If we bear in mind that corporations that want 
to be listed on stock exchanges are those that want to attract new investors, the logical 
consequence is that the number of listed companies that have decided not to implement 
the best corporate governance practice is extremely low. 
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The purpose of “The best CG practice implementation” is to ensure that (all) stakehold-
ers are satisfied with the governance and to achieve long-term sustainability for the 
company. On the other hand, to be a member of a long-term profitable company is the 
“final goal” of every shareholder (excluding punters, who only look for a short time 
profit). Therefore, we may conclude that different definitions of corporate governance 
do not exclude each other. In contrary, they supplement each other. Namely, all above-
mentioned definitions of corporate governance may be resumed in OECD’s definition 
of corporate governance (OECD 2004: 11): “Corporate governance involves a set of 
relationship between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the ob-
jective of the company are set, and the means of attending those objectives and moni-
toring performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper 
incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interest of 
the company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring.” However, 
the latter definition seems to be complete only if we add a following OECD’s statement 
(OECD 2004: 3): “In today’s economies, interest in corporate governance goes beyond 
that of shareholders in the performance of individual company. As businesses play a 
pivotal role in one country’s economy, good corporate governance is a significant seg-
ment of economic growth.”
2. Appropriate system of corporate governance
As definitions of corporate governance differ, the corporate governance systems vary too, 
not only across countries but firms and industry sectors too. There is no “one fit” model 
of corporate governance, therefore each country should develop a spectrum of mecha-
nisms aimed to prevail the agency problem either on first (directors vs. shareholders), 
second (minority vs. majority shareholders) or third level (company vs. stakeholders).
The role of corporate governance system is to reduce or overcome the conflict of inter-
est that in a particular company exist and thus to reduce the agency costs (see Mijoč 
et al. 2014). Which system of corporate governance is going to be applied depends on 
shareholders who establish the company (so called founders of the business) as they 
decide, under the “articles of association”, what kind of governance will be applied. In 
their decision founders are limited by the legal framework. Most scholars recognize two 
regularly used systems of corporate governance: one-tier and a two-tier system. One-
tier system is traditionally used in Anglo-Saxon countries where vast majority of compa-
nies have dispersed structure of shareholders. Two-tier system traditionally dominates in 
Continental-European countries where structure of shareholders is traditionally concen-
trated. Nevertheless, in most European countries (Croatia, France, Italy, Slovenia, FYR 
Macedonia, Iceland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal) it is possible to choose between 
one-tier and two-tier system of corporate governance and the choice is conferred upon 
the founders of the company. It is worthy to notify that one-tier and a two-tier system 
of corporate governance are not the only models of corporate governance1.They should 
1 Specific models exist in Sweeden, Switzerland, across Asian countries, etc.
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be taken as a “skeleton” because they only regulate whether the company is going to be 
governed by general meeting, the supervisory board and board of directors or general 
meeting and the board. For instance, two companies who implemented one-tier system 
may be governed by drastically different system of corporate governance: company “A” 
is obliged to disclose every decision taken on the board of directors on company’s web-
site and one-third of non-executive directors must be employee’s representatives, whilst 
in company “B” board’s decision do not have to be announced on company’s website, 
neither employees are entitled to have their representatives on the board. 
Therefore, each company should implement the system of corporate governance that is 
appropriate to combat those conflict(s) of iinterest that present the threat to company’s 
best interest. As it was mentioned before, in implementing the system of corporate 
governance, founders are limited by the legislative framework (usually set by Compa-
nies Act and Codes of Corporate Governance). Those limitations prevent founders to 
establish the system of governance that is adequate to achieve their personal interest 
instead the interest of the company as a whole. 
3. Corporate governance and firm performance – theoretical analysis
In this chapter, the purpose is to discuss following thesis (without referring on empirical 
evidences): If the company applies best corporate governance practice, effects on firm 
performance are multiple.
According to IFC (International Finance Corporation)2, good corporate governance 
facilitates access to capital (equity and debt capital) what consequently provides long-
term competitiveness for the company. Namely, businesses that actively promote good 
corporate governance practice and that apply highest governance standards, tend to at-
tract more investors willing to provide capital at a lower cost, as a risk inherent to share 
investment is maximally reduced (IFC 2011).
According to (Ehikioya 2009), a well-defined and functioning corporate system helps 
a firm to attract investment, raise funds, and strengthen the foundation for firm perfor-
mance. Moreover, good corporate governance shields a firm from vulnerability to future 
financial distress. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that effective corporate governance minimizes con-
trolling-shareholders’ impact on managers, what consequently increase the probability 
that managers will invest in positive net present value projects for the firm gain. 
In order to discuss in detail the possible effects of sound corporate governance on firm 
performance, we separately yield several assumptions regarding the influence of good 
corporate governance on: reducing agency costs, easier access to capital (both equity 
and debt) and better reputation.
2 IFC is a member of the World Bank Group. It is the largest global development institution focused 
exclusively on the private sector in developing countries (see more at: www.ifc.org).
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3.1. Reducing agency costs and enhancing business efficiency
Compliance with the standards of good corporate governance reduces the conflict of 
interest between different stakeholders who participate in governance, consequently 
reducing the agency costs. Responsible governance (consisted of effective risk manage-
ment and internal controls) enables recognition of potential problems before the serious 
threat occurs, and consequently it creates preconditions for the long-term development 
of the company (IFC 2011). Moreover, compliance with the standards of good corpo-
rate governance helps to enhance the decision-making process. For example, directors 
and shareholders are expected to make more quality decisions when they are better 
informed, when communication process is regulated in an efficient manner and when 
company’s governance structure allows them to understand their roles and responsibili-
ties clearly. That, in turn, should significantly increase the efficiency of financial and 
business activity of the company (IFC 2011).
3.2. Easier access to equity capital
Well-governed companies are suitable for investors. Good corporate governance is 
based on principles of accountability, efficiency, fairness and responsibility in the man-
agement of the firm, transparency – including completeness and accuracy of the in-
formation at all levels. The principle of transparency is of particular importance for 
investors because it provides insight into business and financial data on the company 
before share acquisition. 
According to McKinsey & Company (2000) as cited in IFC (2011), there is an attempt 
amongst investors to introduce corporate governance practice as an essential criterion 
when making investment decisions, what seems to be of significant importance. Ap-
parently investors have recognized that the better corporate governance is, resources 
are more likely to be used in their interest and the risk of channelizing them to private 
portfolios is minimalized. 
The good corporate governance practice has a particular significance in emerging mar-
kets, where investors are not protected as they are in developed markets. Namely, the 
investment risk is bigger and accordingly, the capital cost is higher in countries or 
regions where political situation is turbulent or where legal framework or its judicial 
enforcement is not enough developed to guarantee protection to investors. Thus, even 
modest improvements in corporate governance, in relation to other companies, can at-
tract investors and reduce the price of equity capital, what makes the company more 
competitive (ICF 2011). According to McKinsey & Company (2000), a significant per-
centage of investors are willing to ensure an extra payment for well-governed company. 
For example, they are prepared to pay 13% more for well-governed company in Ger-
many or 14% for well-governed company in USA, whilst they are prepared to pay 25% 
more in China and even 38% more in Russia (cited in IFC 2011).
Moreover, companies that want to have access to domestic and international capital mar-
kets will have to comply with the prescribed standards of corporate governance. Accord-
ing to OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance (2004: 13): “The degree to which 
corporations observe basic principles of good corporate governance is an increasingly 
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important factor in investment decisions. Of particular relevance is the relation between 
corporate governance practices and the increasingly international character of invest-
ment. International flows of capital enable companies to access financing from a much 
larger pool of investors. If countries are to reap the full benefits of the global capital 
market, and if they are to attract long-term “patient” capital, corporate governance 
arrangements must be credible, well understood across borders and adhere to inter-
nationally accepted principles. Even if corporations do not rely primarily on foreign 
sources of capital, adherence to good corporate governance practices will help improve 
the confidence of domestic investors, reduce the cost of capital, underpin the proper 
functioning of financial markets, and ultimately induce more stable source of financing.”
3.3. Easier access to debt capital
Companies that have implemented high standards of corporate governance, regularly 
provide the necessary capital for running a business for lower cost. The cost of the 
capital depends on the level of risk that investors take when supply company with the 
capital: the higher the risk, the higher the cost of the capital (IFC 2011). The risk in-
volves the jeopardy of violating the investors’ right. Thus, if the rights of investors are 
adequately protected, the price of equity and debt capital can be reduced (IFC 2011). 
It should be noted that there is an attempt amongst investors who provide debt capital, 
i.e. creditors, to include corporate governance practice as an important criterion3 when 
making investment decisions. Therefore, implementation of good corporate governance 
enables company to pay lower interest rates and to receive longer deadlines for loans 
repayment (IFC 2011).
3.4. Better reputation
Good corporate governance practice contributes to a better reputation of a company. 
Public confidence in the company is likely to ensure greater confidence in company’s 
products (or services) what consequently provides greater profit. Moreover, as it is 
explicitly emphasized in IFC (2011), good reputation and company’s goodwill4 often 
play a significant role in the assessment of the company’s value, what seems to be of 
primary importance when company is obliged to provide appropriate credit guarantee.
4. Corporate governance and firm performance –  
empirical evidence from literature review
Numerous empirical studies, mentioned in the vast body of literature, attempt to evalu-
ate the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. In that order, 
firm performance is (regularly) measured by operating performance, valuation, and 
stock returns while there is a range variation of measurements attempted to evaluate 
good corporate governance. 
3 For instance: a transparent ownership structure and adequate financial reporting.
4 “Goodwill, in accounting terms, presents the exceeding on the fair value price of the company’s as-
sets that is being purchased. Or to simplify, goodwill is an addition on price that a company has to 
pay when buying another company” (IFC 2011:18).
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According to Love (2011: 48), there are three primary data sources used by researchers 
to construct the measure of corporate governance quality: 
1. Information from company’s by-laws and articles of association, 
2. Independent rankings constructed by rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s, 
and 
3. Firms’ surveys.
Each of these data (from source “1” to source “3”) has its pros and cons. For instance, 
information from company’s by-laws and articles of association suffers from the lack of 
evidence that measures prescribed by by-laws and articles of association are implement-
ed. The independent rankings lack reliability, as the expert’s opinion (used to measure 
corporate governance) depends on the quality of the expert - that is not observable. Fi-
nally rankings built on firms' surveys may suffer from firms’ incentives to misreport the 
quality of their governance (Love 2011). Therefore, a combination of data from sources 
reduces imperfections of each source. In numerous empirical studies where correlation 
between corporate governance and firm performance is evaluated, corporate govern-
ance is measured by a corporate governance index. Different researchers have settled 
separate indexes. For instance, Gompers et al. (2003) have constructed a corporate gov-
ernance index “G” which is consisted of 24 factors divided into five groups: tactics for 
delaying hostile bidders, voting rights, director protection, other takeover defense and 
state laws. Bebchuk et al. (2004) have introduced two indexes, so called “entrenchment 
index” (or “E” index) which is built on 6 factors and “the other provisions index” (or 
“O” index) which is made on 18 factors including “E” index. Brown and Caylor (2004) 
have introduced so-called “governance index” (or Gov-Score index) constructed on 51 
elements divided into eight categories: audit, board of directors, charter/by-laws, direc-
tor education, executive and director compensation, ownership, progressive practice, 
and state of incorporation (see Gawer 2012). In forthcoming empirical research where 
correlation between corporate governance and firm performance in Croatian companies 
listed on Croatian (Zagreb) stock-exchange is going to be tested, we intend to create an 
index using Gov-Score index as an role model, since it is built on 51 factors and we are 
assured that the most reliable indexes are those consisted of numerous factors. Similar 
research can be found in (Korent et al. 2014). 
Vast majority of empirical studies attempted to evaluate the relationship between corpo-
rate governance and firm performance declare firm performance is measured by operat-
ing performance, valuation, and stock returns. 
ROE5 and profit margin6 usually assess operating performance, Tobin’s Q is regularly 
used to measure valuation while dividend yield is used to measure stock return.
5 Return on equity (ROE) measures the rate of return on the ownership interest (shareholders’ equity) 
of the common stock owners. It measures a firm’s efficiency at generating profits from every unit 
of shareholders’ equity (also known as net assets or assets minus liabilities). ROE shows how well 
a company uses investment funds to generate earnings growth. ROEs between 15% and 20% are 
generally considered good.
6 Profit margin is a measure of profitability. It is calculated by finding the net profit as a percentage of 
the revenue.
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Although the vast majority of studies suggest that there is a positive correlation be-
tween corporate governance and firm performance, some studies do not confirm that 
result. Instead, they suggest that the correlation between corporate governance and firm 
performance is negative or neutral, i.e. it does not exist at all. Several studies question 
the causality of this relationship, and thus they suggest that it is a firm performance 
that positively affects corporate governance, not vice versa. Most empirical studies are 
done for one country, usually for USA or UK where capital market is developed, and 
shareholder structure dispersed. Nevertheless, in recent years similar researches have 
been done in developing and undeveloped countries, and there are several cross-country 
studies, too. 
According to Love (2011), we deliver (in Table 1) the list of studies that suggest posi-
tive, negative or neutral relation between corporate governance and firm performance 
and those that question the nature of causality of that relationship. Studies are divided 
into following categories: studies done for USA; for other countries; cross-country stud-
ies. The list is incomplete, but it suggests that studies evaluating correlation between 
corporate governance and firm performance are numerous, and their results are diver-
gent. Nevertheless, the thesis that corporate governance positively affects firm perfor-
mance still prevails.
5. Effects on economic growth
In the broadest sense, well-governed companies contribute more to the economic 
growth, as those companies are stable, sustainable and capable to provide regular profit 
to their shareholders and regular earnings to their employees, and to strengthen inves-
tors’ confidence in the capital market.
If we consider that OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, which is entitled to promote policies designed to achieve the highest sustainable 
economic growth and standard of living in member countries and thus to contribute to 
the development of the world economy, has issued “The OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance” as one of 12 key standards for sound financial system, it is undisputable 
that corporate governance affects positively on economic growth. 
According to OECD (2004: 3), companies play a pivotal role in one country’s economy, 
thus good corporate governance is a significant segment of economic growth. Moreover, 
corporate governance is one key element in improving economic efficiency and growth 
as well as enhancing investors’ confidence (OECD 2004: 11). Namely, the presence of 
an effective corporate governance system, within an individual company and across 
an economy as a whole, helps to provide a degree of confidence that is necessary for 
the proper functioning of market economy. As a result, the cost of capital is lower, and 
firms are encouraged to use resources more efficiently, thereby underpinning economic 
growth (OECD 2004: 11).
According to Claessens (2006: 8), the research on the role of corporate governance 
for economic growth is best understood from broader perspective. For instance, the 
importance of the financial system for economic growth has been clearly established by 
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Table 1. Studies evaluating correlation between corporate governance and firm performance 
Corporate governance affects positively on firm 
performance
There is no positive relationship 
between corporate governance, and firm 
performance / Firm performance affects 
positively on corporate governance
I. USA I. USA
1. Gompers et al. (2003)
2. Bebchuk et al.  (2004)
3. Brown, Caylor  (2004)
4. Larcker et al.  (2007)
1. Yen (2005)
2. Core et al. (2006)
3. Ferreira, Laux (2007)
4. Lehn et al. (2006)
6. Chidambaran et al. (2008)
7. Gillan et al. (2006)
II. OTHER COUNTRIES II. OTHER COUNTRIES
1. Chong, Lopez-de-Silanez (2007) – Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
Venezuela
2. Nenova (2005) – Brazil
3. Abdul Wahab et al. (2007), Haniffa, Hudaib 
(2006) – Malaysia
4. Toudas, Karathanassis (2007) – Greece
5. Gruszczynski (2006), Kowalewski et al. 
(2007) – Poland
6. El Mehdi (2007) – Tunisia
7. Black (2001) – Russia
8. Bae et al. (2007) – Korea
9. Zheka (2006) – Ukraine
10. Kyereboah – Coleman (2007) – Africa
11. Reddy et al. (2008) – New Zeland
12. Bortolotti, Belratti (2006) – China
13. Erickson et al. (2005) – Canada
14. Atanasov et al. (2007) – Bulgaria
15. Black, Khanna (2007) – India
1. Pham et al. (2007) – Australia
2. Rui et al. (2002) – China
3. Aman, Nguyen (2007) – Japan
III. CROSS-COUNTRY STUDIES III. CROSS-COUNTRY STUDIES
1. Klapper, Love (2004)
2. Durnev, Kim (2005)
3. Bauer et al. (2003)
4. Baker et al. (2007)
5. Aggarwal et al. (2007)
6. Chhaochharia, Laeven (2007)
7. De Nicolo et al. (2008)
8. Doidge (2007)
9. Durnev, Fauver (2007)
10. Bruno, Claessens (2007)
Source: Author adaptation from Love (2011); Corporate governance and performance around the 
world: what we know and what we don’t, 63–64.
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Levine (1997) and World Bank (2001) – as cited in Claessens (2006: 8). They suggest 
that almost regardless of how financial development is measured, there is a positive 
relation between financial development and the level of GDP per capita growth. In 
order to function well, financial institutions are required to implement good corporate 
governance practice, thus good corporate governance positively affects financial institu-
tions’ and financial markets’ performance, consequently leveraging economic growth. 
Corporate governance has large impact on economic growth. Aghion et al. (1999) pro-
vide a key insight while Levine (1997) determines the link between capital markets 
efficiency and growth. The problem of capital governance (economic entrenchment) as 
defined in Morck et al. (2005) has deep impact on economic growth through resource 
misallocation resulting in X-inefficient firms (Leibenstein 1966). 
Conclusions 
Corporate governance is an important channel not only in achieving economic growth 
but also distributing the beneficial effects of growth throughout the society. All started 
with Schumpeter’s creative destruction theory and his view on corporate institutions and 
new firms as vital for technological development  (Baležentis, Balkienė 2014). Despite 
a vast body of literature on the subject this nexus is not even near to be unravel. Al-
though a majority of studies speak in favour of corporate governance impact on firms’ 
performance, and thus economic growth, economic theory stands silent. Schumpeter 
was right; capitalism is a changing process, always in a state of flux. The same holds 
true for firms and corporate governance. It is in reality the level of the corporate gover-
nance that ranks firms as new or old and ready for commission by the creative destruc-
tion forces. Within this same evolutionary idea of firms and growth as pointed out by 
Schumpeter lies the biggest problem of capitalism, thus, corporation. Since growth is 
a process of change, pinpointing sound, standard corporate governance principles limit 
business to adapt to change. Not all business can adapt to change and we know that for a 
fact. What it is that differentiate firms in two groups; ones that can and ones that cannot 
adapt to change? The conclusion follows a logic developed by Schumpeter. Accepting 
that growth is a dynamic process under constant change, firms’ must also be dynamic 
and continuously change their organizational structures. However, if we design firms’ as 
“fortresses” built on sound corporate governance policies issued by OECD in 2004 or 
2012 how can a “fortress” adapt to changes in 2015? Obviously, it cannot and it will be 
replaced by something new, not so powerful but dynamic and adaptable to change. This 
is the point authors tried to match in this study and encourage further studies using this 
article as reference point. Flexible and dynamic corporate governance demands much 
more than sound governance policies or standards. Looking at firms from the tangible 
point of view put in the second row the true nature of change – intangible assets and 
values within the firms. Vision, employees’ appreciation, risk awareness, social respon-
sibilities are the true factors qualifying businesses as new and not old for commission. 
To draw an ideal corporate governance charter both tangible and intangible firms values 
(Verbič, Polanec 2014) have to be considered. 
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This paper offer a summary on theoretical and empirical findings of previous research 
explaining the link between corporate governance and firms’ performances and thus 
country's economic growth. Guidelines and future directions for research on corporate 
governance – economic growth link have been reviewed here. Main limitation of the 
paper is that a new methodological framework designed to search the nexus between 
corporate governance and economic growth is missing. Future research should con-
centrate on the best proxy identification for corporate governance. Causality between 
corporate governance and economic growth require a non-biased indicator for corporate 
governance measurement. Otherwise, explaining how corporate governance affects eco-
nomic growth becomes cumbersome since the connection to capital markets, inequality, 
and wage distribution, X-efficiency issues. 
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